Posts Tagged ‘spinoza’s god’

The Optimality of Morals

Posted in Philosophy on May 4th, 2009 by Noldorin – 8 Comments

This post essentially follows on from the Notes on Kant post by David, which having prompted rather a lot of comments and one or two conversations, led to a few interesting conclusions on the subject of morality. Here, however, I mainly intend to express my own views and conclusions on the nature of morals (though David seems to be of much accordance, at least in his end point). I’ll leave it to anyone who wishes to comment to counter my points.

To start, I should mention that my own philosophy on morals seems to be largely in accordance with rule utilitarianism (or at a minor variant of it). What follows is pretty much the set of ideas that guided me to the eventual conclusion regarding optimality. Specifically, I argue that an action is moral if it is beneficial to either oneself or society (or both) and not detrimental to the well-being and continuation of the society as a whole. The intentions of the individual performing the action must also satisfy these conditions if the action is to be deemed moral, else the action must be morally neutral at best. Importantly, this specification implies that choices made with self-interest in mind can be moral so long as the communal benefit is non-negative. This becomes quite obvious given the assumption that the well-being of individuals in general contributes to the well-being of society (at least in an indirect way). Note that the arbiter in all these cases must be hypothetical as well as purely objective (nature itself, if you will), meaning that even though a certain action may be considered immoral as a consensus of society, it may nevertheless be neutral or even moral in actuality. Saying this, in a well-functioning and successful society, there would seem to be a general requirement that the judgement of moral worth of actions is reasonably accurate in a high proportion of situations.

Considering these points and their commonalities is primarily what led me to believe that when you boil everything down, morals are nothing but an approximation to optimality of society. Now as soon one mentions optimality, the question of a measure automatically follows. Of course, most people probably have some vague notion of what an “optimal society” is, but since the aim here is to be as formal and specific as possible, I really need to define a cost function, at least in loose terms. At this point, I would imagine that the opinions of most people would tend to diverge rapidly. Some would reason that the cost function is purely dependant on well-being/happiness/pleasure (whether more for the individual or society separates the hedonists from the utilitarians), while others would state the straightforward biological (yet to many cold and unpleasing) view that optimality is but a measure of the size of the population and thus the continued ability to self-replicate. Finally, the more religious among us might contend that optimality is simply the perfectly obedient following of teachings passed down to us by God. In essence, this cost function is nothing other than the “meaning of life” (in the widest possible sense) – something that may never be defined, and certainly not a discussion I’m going to include in this post! Whatever view people wish to take, I believe that the basic statement that “morals are an approximation for optimality” holds well in all cases. Like the nature of this optimality, the mechanism by which the concept of morality has been instilled in us (evolution, creationism, Spinoza’s God, or whatever) is also open to debate, but nonetheless is not able invalidate this theory in itself, at least in the way I see it. Yet all these concepts of optimality surely do have similarities. Another important feature of the cost function is that parameters should be not only the current state of humanity and the world, but also the states at points in the future (perhaps stretching infinitely far ahead in time). In the end, I think I can say that I do personally feel reasonably content with this definition of morals (albeit most likely an incomplete one). In my mind one cannot proceed any further in a formal definition without invoking reasons akin to the “meaning of life” such as those just mentioned – all very contentious or speculative and therefore not terribly helpful as bases for any fundamental theories, in my view.

Now to properly round off these theories, I ought to explain in more detail what I mean by an “approximation” to optimality. In my conclusion, I came to realise that moral principles (stressing the fact these principles are what are percdeived by men to be moral) may not necessarily lead to optimality in all cases, however you want to define the term. There can clearly exist an action performed at a certain time that to the best of everyone’s knowledge appears moral, yet has long-term ramifications that are generally negative – an unlikely case perhaps, but a quite possible one irrespective. It then follows that either a) the action cannot actually be considered absolutely moral because of these consequences in the (distant) future, or b) the motivation/action is perfectly moral (given the limitations in the nature of the actor) but not necessarily optimal under whatever cost function you choose. I would think option a) would appear immediately quite wrong, since it would contradict the idea that moral actions can be knowingly performed, which just silliness under any definition. We are then forced to accept option b), in other words that morals are only approximation guides to optimal behaviour and therefore optimal results (though most likely very good approximations). The next question is: does there exist any better approximation to optimality than morality? Of course, omniscience combined with perfect reasoning might be considered the ideal way to produce an optimal society and would seem to appear more “useful” than morals, but this is something which we as humans fall short of by an effectively infinite margin. Let’s suppose the evolutionary viewpoint for a moment here, simply because it leads to a curious hypothetical case. Is there a point at which we as a species may become intelligent enough to produce a more optimal society purely by reasoning? Is there a threshold at which it suddenly becomes more sensible to follow pure reason than moral instincts, or will both always be required to varying degrees? I’ll leave those questions unanswered, since they are largely side points to my cse, though it does at least highlight the issue in relation to current and past societies. Now surely no-one would argue that high-level reasoning can’t be used alongside (augmenting?) instinctual/inherent morals (indeed it is arguably a more “intelligent” form of morals that makes mankind particularly moral). Nevertheless it should be quite clear in looking around ourselves that there are dangers in the outcomes of limited reasoning overriding recognisably moral behaviour. Perhaps we can even attribute immoral behaviour at its root to to the arrogance or egotism (by this I really mean selfishness) of humans – whether in valuing their own well-being over that of society as a whole or their own powers of reasoning over moral principles. The latter is perhaps a more unintentional form, due to the failure of limited consciousness to realise its own limitations in forseeing complex (or at times even relatively simple) consequences of actions. To explain what might appear to be the widespread existance of the dominance of egotism in individuals’ personal cost functions, we may attribute this to the imperfection of our nature or the fact that evolution has taken an imperfect shortcut. In either case, it is certain that placing a significant weight on self-interest is highly beneficial to both the individual and the society, yet just a bit too much can have hugely negative effects. For me, what the commonness of egotism implies is nothing but the presence of something other than morality in people’s own cost functions – whereas morality has its benefits and imperfections, egotism simply has less of the former and more of the latter, and is grouped outside of morality for this reason (while a modicum of self-interest being on the moral side). Clearly, there is some sort of spectrum in judging the moral value of traits. Drawing all the previously mentioned things together, I feel I can now justify my definition of morality as an “approximation” or “shortcut” to optimal behaviour for the species as a whole.

It is without doubt important to stress that morals have their own imperfections and limitations, like analytical reasoning, and depend on the individuals (or society thereof) in which they have formed. Yet depending on how you look at it, morals have  evolved or been designed specifically for the purpose of optimal society. Although morality may be less adaptable than intelligence (at least over the timespans ranging from days to maybe lifetimes), it assuredly has a more “tailored” purpose, and therefore has its place alongside, and arguably ahead of, analytical reasoning.

If I were to now summarise how I believe optimal behaviour should be guided, I would say that it’s necessary to be somewhat careful not to propose something too uncompromisable. In reality, it’s almost always the case that reasons are more intricate and subtle than immediately apparent. In stating an emphasis on paying due attention to intrinsic morals (loosely, which can be recognised as principles and codes that typically “feel right” and are “seen to be right” by consensus of society), and contrarily wariness in ignoring these morals in favour of some sort of pure reasoning. “Reasoning”, after all, when performed by humans, cannot help but be intruded by egotistical motives, among other notable imperfections. Do we not after all have a fear of so-called purely “rational” or “logical” machines not hesitating to perform tasks that are undeniably immoral in the eyes of man (if not only founded in science fiction and our imaginations)?

As a quick final note, I ought to mention that nowhere in my musings have I required morals to be static in nature. Equally, there would not seem to be any issue with them being unchangeable. At this point I’m further tempted to divide morals into two categories: intrinsic and social. Again, this is a matter on which I’m only going to lightly touch. The latter is the one of particular interest in that it could imply a varying cost function for optimality. It also suggests a mutual feedback cycle between the will of society and contemporary moral values (with analytical reasoning somewhere in the process, potentially acting both positively or negatively).

Right, so this post has wound on long enough by now, and is only getting increasingly vague and leaving more loose ends. Still, I hope that I’ve at least partially conveyed my theories and general impressions on the subject. I’m not sure how everything appears to others who haven’t followed the continuous discussion on the wider topic (largely originating with David’s post). I’d certainly be keen to hear what anyone else thinks on the subject and the ideas presented here. I would not at all be surprised to receive opinions that this relation of morals to optimality seems distasteful or even incomplete to many people. Indeed, I am not sure that I am wholly satisfied with this explanation as the “root” of morals. (How can I, having already cynically accepted the fallibility of human rationalisation?) Maybe it is as a student of physics that I realise our theories of the nature, physical or human, are always but approximations to a more profound reality.